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PN co-editor Milan Rai teases out the Iran crisis
Making a grand bargain
Milan Rai
International law does not ban
uranium enrichment. In fact,
countries which have signed the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) gain the `inalienable right' to develop nuclear
power programmes for peaceful
purposes.
The bargain made in 1968 was
that non-nuclear weapon states
would gain access to nuclear
technology, so long as they did
not use it to develop nuclear
weapons (Article IV); and the
nuclear weapon states would get
rid of all their nuclear weapons
(Article VI).
There are two core problems
with this bargain. Firstly, there is
no mechanism or timetable in Arti-
cle VI for forcing the nuclear
weapon states to disarm.
Secondly, Article IV gives non-nuclear weapon states which have
signed the NPT the right to (a)
develop their civilian nuclear
power capabilities right up to the
threshold of nuclear weapons production, and (b) withdraw from the
treaty at any time.
This means they are legally
entitled to build peaceful nuclear
technology under the watchful eye
of the International Atomic Energy
Authority (IAEA), become "threshold" states, then expel the IAEA
and cross the threshold to
become nuclear weapon states.
Iran's ambitious nuclear power
programme may be worrying for
the region, but it is entirely legal
under the NPT.
If the US and UK want Iran to
give up its legal rights, but, in
diplomacy, to persuade someone
to give up a right that they possess, you must offer them something of equal value, to compensate them for their loss.
In practical terms, the head of
the IAEA has warned, bombing
Iran is highly unlikely to prevent
Iran acquiring nuclear weapons if
it is determined to do so.
In December 2005, Mohamed
ElBaradei said: "You cannot use
force to prevent a country from
obtaining nuclear weapons. By
bombing them half to death, you
can only delay the plans,"
Accelerating the bomb
According to Dr Frank Barnaby
(formerly of the Atomic Weapons
Establishment, Aldermaston),
bombing would probably accelerate Iran's nuclear programme.
There is limited intelligence as
to the whereabouts of all Iran's
nuclear-related facilities and materials, which means airstrikes
would be unlikely to destroy the
entire programme.
Furthermore, bombing might
lead Iran to concentrate on a clandestine crash nuclear weapons
programme using secret facilities,
salvaged materials, and possibly
procuring supplies via criminal
sources. (Would Air Strikes Work?
See ORG note on the right.)
There is only one way to be
100% certain that Iran cannot
develop a bomb: carpet-bombing.
Noam Chomsky pointed out in
PN2484 that some military analysts think this is a live option. The
US would seize Iran's oil-rich
Khuzestan province (next to Iraq)
and "bomb the rest of the country
to dust".
Rational Iran
An underlying theme of Western
commentary is that Iran is an irrational and dangerous state.
There are certainly figures within the Iranian leadership with
extreme religious beliefs. We
should note, however, that president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does
not determine foreign, military or
nuclear policy.
In the Iranian constitution, it is
the supreme leader, ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, who is in charge of
these areas. And Khamenei has
followed a rational and generally
cautious foreign policy  certainly
compared to that of major West-
ern powers.
Iran has effectively cooperated
with the two US wars in the
region. In the case of Afghanistan,
Iran offered to carry out search
and rescue operations for US
pilots forced to crash land on Iran-
ian territory (hinting that Iran was
permitting US overflights of its ter-
ritory). In Iraq, despite the rhetoric
on both sides, Tehran seems to
have played a calming rather than
a provoking role.
"The grand bargain"
It was in the immediate aftermath
of the invasion that Iran made its
most dramatic overture to Wash-
ington.
In April 2003, Iran sent a
detailed peace proposal to the US
State Department via Switzerland.
Flynt Leverett, then a senior director on the US National Security
Council, saw the document, and
later described it as "a serious
effort, a respectable effort to lay
out a comprehensive agenda for
US-Iranian rapprochement."
Iran proposed comprehensive
talks aimed at ending US sanctions, gaining full access to
peaceful nuclear technology and
recognition of Iran's "legitimate
security interests" in the region.
Iran's offer
In return, the Islamic Republic was
willing to concede aggressive
inspection rights for the IAEA,
"decisive action" against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, the end
of "material support" for Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, the conversion
of Lebanon's Hezbollah into a
purely political organisation, and
finally, acceptance of the Saudi
initiative for a two-state solution in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Among other things, Iran was
offering to officially accept the
existence of Israel.
The response from Washington? A formal note to the Swiss
ambassador expressing displeasure at his having forwarded such a
document. The US refused to
even acknowledge the Iranian
offer.
Across the political spectrum, it
is now recognised that a "grand
bargain" of the kind offered in
2003 will be needed to bring the
current crisis to an end.
Security guarantee
A key issue will be Washington's
willingness to offer a security
guarantee  a commitment not to
invade or attack Iran  as part of
the "bargain".
This is what president Putin
thought he had secured in mid-October, when he travelled to
Tehran to meet ayatollah
Khamenei (see p1).
Iran's oil crisis
Some of the suspicion felt
towards Iran comes from the fact
that it is swimming in oil and gas.
Why on earth would it want
nuclear power?
According to researcher Roger
Stern of Johns Hopkins University
geography department, Tehran
does have a case (insofar as any
country has a case for nuclear
power).
Because Iran has a young and
growing population, and rising living standards, more and more of
the oil is being used internally
rather than being exported to earn
foreign exchange.
This is a major issue because
Iran derives most of its government income (63% in 2004) from
oil exports.
Because the growth in oil pro-
duction is sluggish, but the growth
in domestic demand for energy is
surging, Stern calculates the
amount of oil available for export
is declining by over 10% every
year.
He estimates that by 2015, on
current trends, Iran will not be
able to export any oil at all, which
would reduce government spending by two-thirds.
So Iran does have a case for
developing other ways of generating energy for the domestic market. Stern points out that Tehran
also has ambitious goals for additional power generation from coal,
hydro, solar, and thermal
resources.
Nuclear is one part of this "larger if ill-managed plan to preserve
exports".
What does Iran want?
Having said this, it would hardly
be surprising if some part of the
establishment in Iran wanted to
follow the logic of "deterrence", as
Iran is surrounded by nuclear
weapon states (Israel, India, Pakistan, Russia, and US bases or
forces in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates and in the Gulf
itself).
Avner Cohen, historian of the
Israeli nuclear bomb, suggests
that if Iran has "deterrent" ambitions, it might still not be aiming at
the full development of a nuclear
bomb.
Instead, "while remaining within
the NPT, Iran would be seeking to
acquire a perception and reputation (by ways of leaks, rumours,
double talk, etc) that they have
actually built a `secret' nuclear
arsenal or at least secretly accumulated a sufficient amount of
weapons-grade fissile material."
By thus "mimicking the Israeli
model", Iran would "get all the
prestige and deterrence effects
they need but without leaving the
NPT, let alone without testing or
declaring such a bomb".
This article is partly based on the
JNV's Drawing Paradise on the
"Axis of Evil" reviewed on p18.
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