EU intervention in Congo: a milestone on the way to a military Europe?

Andreas Speck

Disguised as a "humanitarian intervention" and giving "support tobuilding democracy", the sec ond major EU military intervention in Congo began this June. As Peace News goes to press, 2,000EU troops from 20 EU countries (plus Turkey) are being deployedin Congo, to safeguard the elec tions in the DRC. Officially, the EU mission (named EUFOR RD Congo) aimsto support the 19,000 UN "peace keepers" already in the country .The UN force (MONUC) became famous recently for contributing tothe systematic destruction of civil ian-occupied villages 1. Separately,the EU will provide mapping sup port to MONUC via the EU satel -lite centre 2. EU interests in DR CongoThe European Defence White Paper of 2004 states: "As thewars of Y ugoslav succession have demonstrated, but also the col -lapse of Sierra Leone or the rising chaos in the Democratic Repub -lic of Congo (DRC), the harmful consequences of failing stateshave a tendency to spread. 3" The 2004 "Food for thought"paper on European battle groups, produced by Britain,France, and Germany, points out that the EU battle groups (to beoperational by 2007) should be used (but not limited to) "failedor failing states (of which most are in Africa)"4.There is a big question in how far European colonial historyand their present-day economic interests contribute to the "fail -ing" of states. The DRC was a Belgiancolony which became independ ent in 1960 and its first electedpresident was Patrice Lumumba, killed with the support of Bel -gian forces in 1961. During the Cold War, the W est supportedthe dictator Mobutu. He was overturned by Laurent-De'sire'Kabila in 1997 (who was assassinated in January 2001, to bereplaced by his son). A civil war --or perhaps African W orldWar--involving troops from Uganda, Rwanda, and otherAfrican countries, waged in the country, leaving more than threemillion people dead. This war officially ended with a ceasefirein 1999, but fighting continues up to today. A 2002 peace agree-ment demanded that elections take place by June 2005, with afinal deadline of July 2006. The country currently has aninterim government, with presi dent Joseph Kabila, and fourvice-presidents. The democratic credentials of this government:all but the opposition represen tatives are war criminals5. Europe's high techBut it's not just about "failing states"--it's also aboutresources. The Democratic Republic of Congo is one ofmain suppliers of coltan, a rare metal used in high tech prod -ucts such as mobile phones and computer chips. It is mined bywarlords to finance their own militias. Three companies -Cabot Inc of the United States, Germany's HC Starck andChina's Nigncxia - are the only firms with processing plants toturn coltan into the coveted tan talum powder6.HC Starck 7 produces about 50% of the world' s tantalumpowder and is a subsidiary of Bayer, one of Germany' s majorchemical and pharmaceutical multinational companies(although the company announced on 27 March 2006that it wishes to sell HC Starck 8). HC Starck is not involved inmining itself, but buys its coltan from companies such as the UK-based A&M Minerals and Met als, and Belgium based Sogem,both of which get some of their coltan ore via Uganda, and cantherefore not be certain that is isn't mined in the DRC 9, and is helping to finance the militias10.As well as coltan, the country also has rich resources of copper(estimated to be worth more than US$450 billion 11) andcobalt. Congo-Brazaville and theDRC both also hold oil reserves of interest to EU countries. Thecountry's most significant oil and gas fields are offshore, alongthe country's 22 km Atlantic Ocean coastline, at the estuary ofthe Congo River which is sand wiched between the prolific off -shore producing region of northern Angola and its oil-richenclave of Cabinda (another con flict zone). Of these, the Mibalefield, discovered in 1973 by Chevron, contains 48% of theCoastal Basin' s recoverable reserves and remains Congo' smost productive field. The gas field discovered here has notbeen exploited yet 12. In 2004 the German under -Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence, Friedbert Pflu"ger ,wrote: " Because, accor ding to the OECD, Europe increasingly has toimport energy from other regions, it is important to be more aware of theoil wealth of Africa as a potential to diversify energy supply"13. EU interventions in DRCThe present EU intervention - though small compared to theUN force (MONUC) --is highly significant, partly because theEU has chosen to send its own intervention force, and does notcontribute significantly to the UN troops operating in thecountry. While EUFOR DR Congo is sanctioned by the UN,it is deployed under EU com mand--something which sounds very familiar from past US "peaceenforcement" operations in the Balkans and elsewhere... This is not the first and only EU intervention in Congo. In 2003,Operation Artemis was the first--and lar ger--military inter -vention by EU military forces without NATO support. It tookplace between June and September 200314. Artemis was a testingground for autonomous EU mili tary operations, and was mainlyunder French command. After three months the troops left thecountry: nothing had changed... In 2004, the EU began itsoperation EUPOL Kinshasa, to monitor, mentor, and advise theIntegrated Police Unit (IPU)-- special units of the Congolesepolice, tasked to protect institu tions and personnel of the inter -im government. The EU says it wants to train more than 1,000police officers. During opposition protestsagainst the postponement of elections in June 2005, the Con -golese police cracked down on peaceful protesters. It is not clearwhether officers trained by the EU took part in these actions.In 2005, EUSEC DR Congo was launched to support EUPOLKinshasa with a military compo nent, "to provide advice andassistance for security sector reform". As part of this mission,military advisers would be assigned to the "following keyposts within the Congolese administration: the private officeof the Minister for Defence, the combined general staff, includingthe integrated military structure (IMS), the army general staff, theNational Committee for Disar mament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER), theJoint Operational Committee" 15. On top of all this, the Euro -pean Union is financing 80% of the expenses for the upcomingelections. There are serious doubts about the motives for theEU's engagement in Congo. The military wingSo far, all these EU activities have not contributed very muchto security in the DRC--the Eastern provinces, whereArtemis was deployed, are still an area with a lot of fighting,and abuse by militias, govern ment, and UN forces. With the training of police and military by EUPOL andEUSEC, the EU contributes to the strengthening of the presentinterim government--made up of war criminals and not too pop -ular with the Congolese people. The military presence during theelections this year can also be seen as a statement of support to thepresent government--and it has to be seen what will happen afterthe general election results have been announced on 19 July. Thereare fears that violence might erupt again, especially if thepower struggle, which has been partly transferred from the battle -field to the polling booth, does not bring the results desired bythe (former) warlords, supported by EU money and prestige.Rather than providing real support to the people of the DRC,the EU interventions in the DRC establish the "military arm" of theEuropean Union, and help to establish the European Union as areal global player , which can rely not only on its economic power toenforce its interests, but can also act militarily when needed. In this sense, EUFOR DR Congo is not only worrying forthe people of Congo, but should also be of concern to peaceactivists in Europe. Andreas Speck works with War Resisters' International.
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