Whoever you vote for, Washington wins

Milan Rai

The elections in Iraq have been an unprecedented opportunityfor ordinary people to influ ence the destiny of theircountry, but the National Assembly they have electedis so hedged in with USimposed restrictions that thecabinet it produces will be more like a chain-gang ofprisoners than an independ ent government.A prominent Iraqi politician in the Shia coalition told the New Yorker in January that the US had quietly told the partiesbefore the election that there were three conditions for thenew government: it should not be under the influence of Iran; itshould not ask for the withdrawal of US troops; and it shouldnot install an Islamic state.

Re-Ba'athification

One important but neglected issue is the steady re-Ba'athifi -cation of the security forces under US direction. This re-Ba'athification is hotly rejected by the majority Shia coalition,and is therefore a key issue for the new government.
The British mass media, as elsewhere, has concentrated onthe division of power between the Sunni, Shia and Kurdishcommunities, and on how power may be shared betweenthe different elements of the "winning" Shia coalition. Whathas not been examined is the framework within which thenewly-elected National Assem bly, and the soon to be appoint -ed "Iraqi T ransitional Govern ment", must operate.

Devices for control

What has also been off the agenda, due to a colossal act ofmedia self-censorship, is the division of power between theelected Iraqi National Assem bly and the unelected US-ledoccupation. There are several levers of power that the US hascreated to retain control.
    One US device is the T ransi-tional Administrative Law (TAL), an interim constitutionwritten in W ashington and imposed on Iraq in March2004. Jawad al-Maliki, member of Daawa, one of the two mainShia parties, has pointed out correctly that "the body whichwe have elected has more legitimacy than this document".Unfortunately, the T AL is selfdefined as the default constitu -tion of Iraq until a permanent constitution has been adoptedin a referendum.
    In a clause bitterly rejectedby the Shia majority parties, the TAL states that the perma -nent constitution must obtain the approval of at least one-third of the voters in sixteen of Iraq's eighteen provinces. Thiswas put in to give Kurdish provinces a veto over the finaltext (it also gives Sunni-domi nated provinces the same veto).
    If this veto is used by the Kurds, the T AL continues to bethe constitution. (And, accord ing to Article 59 of the TAL, theIraqi military will continue to function under US command.)
    The effect of these provisions of the T ransitional Administra -tive Law is to give the US gov ernment's most loyal clients inIraq-the Kurds--a powerful veto over political progress.
    Another device for US con trol is the debt relief plan put together in November 2004,under which some of Iraq's creditor nations will for give some ofIraq's debt (in stages), conditional upon the Iraqi governmentfollowing an IMF "liberalisa tion" programme. This pro -gramme will prioritise foreign investors, privatisation, and "taxreform", but not unemployment or poverty in Iraq.
    The new Iraqi government will have to choose betweendefying the rulers of the inter national economic and financialorder, or following the IMF . Following the IMF will alsomean pursuing the economic re-structuring and privatisationset in motion by US adminis trator Paul Bremer during histime as ruler of Iraq.

Sticks not carrots

The main tool of US control is, of course, military . As the Financial Times pointed out recently, "US leverage restsupon awareness among the Shia that their government is unlike -ly to survive a civil war without continued US sup port". The Shia coalition that won thegreatest number of votes in the election had to announce its listof candidates in the Convention Centre in the US-controlled"Green Zone" in Baghdad, "protected by US soldiers".

Points of leverage

In November 2003, when the US unveiled an earlier versionof the "handover" process, a senior US official told the New York Times, "It's a gamble, a huge gamble. But it' s easy tooverestimate the degree of con trol over events we have nowand to underestimate how much we will retain." Anothersenior official said that even after the establishment of theinterim Iraqi government, "We'll have more levers thanyou think, and maybe more than the Iraqis think." Amongthe levers the US expected to be able to use: the US militarypresence itself; the $20bn US reconstruction budget for Iraq;and the requirements of US investors.
Another device for maintain ing control was Paul Bremer' sappointment of key officials for five-year terms just before leav -ing office. In June 2004, the US governor ordered that thenational security adviser and the national intelligence chief cho -sen by the US-imposed interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, begiven five-year terms, imposing Allawi's choices on the electedgovernment. Bremer also installed inspectors-general forfive-year terms in every min istry, and formed and filledcommissions to regulate com munications, public broadcast -ing and securities markets.

Who's security?

It is in the area of national security that Allawi' s choices aremost significant. A former Ba'athist himself (see JNVBriefing 67), Allawi restored former servants of the Saddamregime to important posts, and has filled the security forceswith former Ba'athists. Sad dam's Special Forces soldiersand former intelligence officials are even being rehired as apolice commando strike force. Last summer Allawi' s govern -ment appointed Rasheed Flayeh to the post of director -generalof the secret police force, despite objections from theSupreme Commission for DeBa'athification that as head ofsecurity in the city of Nasiriyah, Flayeh had takenpart in the brutal suppression of the 1991 Shia uprising.
Last October, Allawi tried and failed to disband the De-Ba'athification Commission (headed by his old rival AhmedChalabi). Allawi wanted to be able to openly readmit formersenior Ba'athists to power unless they have been foundguilty of serious crimes in court, a policy supported by the USgovernment. The Shia coalition that has "won" the elections hasvowed to reverse re-Ba'athifica tion, and it is likely thatAllawi's enthusiasm for this policy will bar him from being acompromise prime minister in the new government.

Milan Rai, author of Regime Unchanged, is coordinator of Justice Not Vengeance (email milanrai@btinternet.com).
Justice Not Vengeance (0845 458 9571 (UK); +44 1424 428 792; m 07980 748 555; http://www.j-n-v.org/ ).