Transforming arms into art

Jan Van Criekinge

Mozambique belongs in Southern Africa, amongst the countries most affected by war and violence over the past decades. Its geostrategic position - in the context of Cold War relationships in Southern Africa, its proximity to the economic heart of apartheid, and its major railway and transport routes to the Indian Ocean - made Mozambique very vulnerable to the policy of "destabilisation" by the two remaining white minority governments in the region, following its independence from Portugal in 1975.
The long guerrilla war (1964-1974)against oppressive Portuguese colonialism developed a tradition of armed struggleand guerrilla heroism that didn't end with independence. Few wars have beenas bitterly controversial both inside and outside a country, and marked by suchdis-information and propaganda by both sides, as the one which destroyed Mozam-bique from 1976 to 1992. In this war-- which pitted the central Marxist govern-ment of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) against the guer-rilla rebels of the National Mozambican Resistance (Renamo)--between 350,000and 600,000 people were killed, another two million were displaced, and most of thecountry's rural and economical infrastructure was virtually destroyed. In particular,the massive use of landmines by both sides, placed all over the country, put a severemortgage on any future development.
However since the war ended on 4October 1992, with the general peace agreement signed in Rome between theopposing parties and with the backing and financial support of many internationalinstitutions, peace and the process of reconciliation seems quite sustainable inMozambique. In this process grassroots groups based on both traditional commu-nity structures and more "modern" institutions played a very important role.

External or internal?

Partisans of both parties involved in the war continue to disagree over the natureand degree of internal support and external assistance received by Renamo, and aboutthe failures made by the Frelimo government after independence (due to manyunfulfilled expectations by the poor rural population).
Since its founding in 1976 by members of the Rhodesian security forces, and withthe aim of destabilising the newly independent country, Renamo built on the splitbetween the urban and rural segments of Mozambican society. At the end of the1980s Renamo forces controlled a great part of the central Mozambican country-side and enjoyed the allegiance, either voluntarily (ethnic background andrespect towards traditional chiefs) or by brute force (forced recruitment, use ofchild soldiers, atrocities) of the rural population. On the other hand the centralgovernment's autocratic style of rule and its attempts to turn Mozambique into a"communist" society--by purging it of traditional leadership down to the local village level, alienated both many earlyparty members who had been active in the anti-colonial struggle, and the ruralpopulation in general. Frelimo made itself deeply unpopular by declaring tra-ditional rule and practices "backward". This stage of widespread popular discon-tent generated large internal support for an externally-backed movement such asRenamo. The rebel movement found it easy to recruit new and young fightersbesides its regular practice of forced recruitment, and forced villages under itscontrol to provide food for the fighters. The rural population, thoroughly trauma-tised by the ongoing atrocities, left the countryside in large numbers. Parts ofMozambique became ungovernable and unsafe for everyone, especially because ofthe number of landmines.
At the end of the 1980s, with thechanges in South Africa that would lead to the death of the apartheid system andwith the collapse of the Soviet Union, the destabilisation campaign against the so-called Front Line States, of which Mozambique was a significant member,also came to an end. Widespread warfatigue on both sides, the growing aware-ness that neither side could win the war through military confrontation, the lackof external support after the end of the Cold War, and international mediation,finally brought a sustainable peace. In contrast with what happened in Angola,both parties were involved in the peace process and large sums of internationalmoney has been spent on appeasing both sides, particularly Renamo. Althoughmany Renamo leaders could easily be convicted of war crimes against civilians.

The bought peace

It was against this background that the reconciliation process began. The generalpeace agreement of 1992 was remarkably comprehensive. It included rules about theformation of political parties, it guaranteed freedom of movement and freedom of thepress, it made clear provisions on how elections should be held, and it madearrangements for the massive demobilisation and reintegration of former fightersof both sides into civilian life. One week after the signing of the peace agreementthe United Nations approved the establishment of the United Nations Operationsin Mozambique (UNOMOZ) to monitor and verify its implementation. Despiteserious scandals, the very bureaucratic way of working and the high cost (one millionUS$ per day!), for nearly two-and-a-half years this UN operation was quite a success.UN monitoring included demobilisation, encampment of ex-combatants, prepara-tion for elections, mine clearance and lots of humanitarian assistance. The criticismsometimes heard about the peace process is that Mozambican peace was literallybought--with lots of international money.
The first multiparty, democratic andfree elections after the end of the war in 1994 showed a clear, although complexand regional-based, picture of popular support for both sides. The results of thelatest general elections (December 1999) showed few differences compared to the1994 results. It's clear that Renamo, which is now the major opposition party, canstill count on a large popular support in the central provinces, while support forthe ruling Frelimo party of president Joaquim Chissano is located in the deepsouth and in the northern provinces.
The consolidation of peace dependsprimarily on how the reconstruction process addresses the profound social divi-sions, political alienation and poverty that sustained the war for so many years. Inthe first place the reconstruction should meet the needs of the millions of desper-ately poor rural people who, isolated from large urban and economic centres, andconfronted in their daily life with the deadly consequences of widespread land-mines, have so far seen too few tangible benefits of peace. The resettlement of somesix million displaced persons and war refugees also continues to be a cause forsome concern. Eight years after the end of the war, many former fighters continue tonurse grievances due to the few economic opportunities open to them and the lack ofrecognition of their contribution to the war and the suffering they endured. But majorconfrontations could be avoided due to the mediation of churches and other grassrootsinitiatives and the fact that the two belligerents had both lost their will to fight.

Traditional healing

War-affected populations in rural Mozambique continue to draw on a widerange of traditional rituals to help them deal with the traumas of war and to openthe way of reconciliation. In Mozambique, as in many other parts of Africa, health istraditionally defined as harmonious relationships between human beings and theirnatural surroundings, between them and their ancestors, and among themselves.Such models of healing contradict Western approaches--in which individuals andtheir social context are more often perceived as quite distinguishable entities.
    Home-grown, informal, based on ageold practices of welcoming, healing,counselling and reintegration, this particular "culture of peace", very closely linkedwith the different rural Mozambican cultures, has been responsible for the sus-tainability of the peace process.
    Civil society as such did not reallydevelop in Mozambique before the ruling Frelimo party had renounced its monopolyon all social and political activity and freedom of the press was guaranteed.During the beginning of the 1980s, by far the most important internal players pro-moting a climate for peace talks between Renamo and Frelimo, were the churches.The Roman Catholic Church archbishop Jaime Gonc,alves of Beira played a key roleas a mediator, often in close connection with the Rome-based Sant'Egidio Com-munity. The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM), an ecumenical body ofmostly Protestant churches, established a Peace and Reconciliation Commission in1984. The CCM played a key role in brokering local ceasefires in very remote areasas well as defusing tensions and promoting all kinds of grassroots developmentsin the post-war era. The CCM runs a programme entitled "Transforming Armsinto Hoes" which includes the destruction of weapons. The Methodist bishop ofMaputo, Bernardino Manellate, is one of the co-ordinators of the CCM projects inthis field. In the same vein is the project of the Maputo-based artist's collective"Nucleo de Arte". By transforming weapons into artistic productions the,mostly young, artists try to cast-off their war trauma [see p33 for review].With peace firmly established and the end of the one-party state system, spacehas emerged for non-state actors--other than the churches--to play a role in theprocess of peace and reconciliation. The independent media, human rights organi-sations, local landmines awareness groups, and many other NGOs, havehelped produce the peace desired by the great majority of the Mozambican popu-lation. One of these groups is LINK--an umbrella NGO, which represents a broadvariety of associations currently engaged in civil education and non-violent meth-ods of conflict resolution. LINK is supported by--among others--the Mennon-ite Central Committee from Canada.
    Considering the terrible, violent anddestructive recent past of Mozambique, the population has, in general, demonstratedan extraordinary capacity for reconciliation, very often based on traditional methodsand with the financial support of many external donors. In this respect theMozambican experience might be seen as a "model" for other African regions that arecurrently at war.

Notes:
Many of the ideas developed in this article were discussed at an interview with Bernardino Manellate, the Methodist Bishop of Maputo, at his residence on 16 July 1999. Further information on the peace and reconciliation process in Mozambique can be found in the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, edited by the Awepa office in Maputo, available on the web in English: www.mozambique.mz/awepa.LINK,
Forum de ONG, Projecto de Capacitac,a~o em Resoluc,a~o de Conflitos e Mediac,a~o, CP 2187, Maputo, Mozambique (e-mail: conflict@link.uem.mz ).